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Note: Procedural Due Process in Parole Release
Proceedings-Existing Rules, Recent Court Decisions,
and Experience in the Prison
Although courts traditionally have adopted a "hands off"
approach to legal proceedings involving prisoners,' the Supreme
Court in the last decade has required prison officials to observe
procedural due process in all significant areas of the correctional
process except parole release decisionmaking.2 The Court has
not addressed a claim for due process by a potential parolee.
Such a claim would merit particularly close scrutiny, for a pris-
oner's interest in parole release may be as strong as or stronger
than any other prisoner interest that has been accorded proce-
dural protection.
This Note will explore the issues that have been raised in
recent circuit courts of appeals decisions regarding the role of
procedural due process in parole release proceedings. Considera-
tion will initially focus on whether procedural due process is re-
quired in this context. It will be shown that the interests of a
potential parolee are significant and are constitutionally pro-
tected. The Note then will assess each procedural safeguard that
might be extended to inmates seeking parole by determining
whether it is supported by case laws and whether, in view of
1. The courts have generally refused to interfere with the discre-
tion of prison officials but nevertheless have recognized that people in
prison do retain certain fundamental rights. See Comment, Due Process
at In-Prison Disciplinary Proceedings, 50 CM.-KENT L. Rav. 498, 499(1973). For an example of judicial intervention to protect a fundamen-
tal right, see Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972) (freedom of religion).
2. Comment, Procedural Protection at Parole Release Hearings:
The Need for Reform, 1974 DuKE L.J. 1119. The decision-making proc-
ess usually is triggered when an inmate whose eligibility for parole is
determined by his sentencing judge applies for parole after serving a
minimum term. See, e.g., Rules of the United States Board of Parole, 28
C.F.R. §§ 2.2-2.11 (1975).
3. This Note will not analyze legislative establishment of pro-
cedural due process in parole release decisions. Two circuit courts have
held that section 6(d) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5
U.S.C. § 555 (e) (1970), compels the United States Board of Parole to fur-
nish federal prisoners with a statement of reasons upon denial of parole.
Mower v. Britton, 504 F.2d 396 (10th Cir. 1974); King v. United States,
492 F.2d 1337 (7th Cir. 1974). The Board's rules incorporate this require-
ment. 28 C.F.R. § 2.13 (1975).
The courts should not rely on the APA, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06,
1305, 3105, 3344 (1970), as an excuse for failing to recognize the due proc-
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the pertinent prisoner and government interests, it otherwise
merits constitutional status. Since the United States Board
of Parole has recently promulgated new rules to govern federal
parole proceedings, the Note will also outline the salient features
of those rules and comment on the extent to which they are de-
sirable and are in conformity with the Constitution.4
I. THE NECESSITY OF REQUIRING DUE PROCESS
IN PAROLE RELEASE PROCEEDINGS
A. PRESENT AvAIABrIITY OF PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS
TO PRISONERS
The Supreme Court requires the government to observe
procedural due process only in connection with action that may
deprive an individual of a fourteenth or fifth amendment interest
in liberty or property.5 The words "liberty" and "property,"
ess rights of prisoners, however, for the solution it offers is incomplete.
For example, the "brief statement" of reasons required under APA stand-
ards may necessitate only a sentence or two of individualized explana-
tion, see King v. United States, 492 F.2d 1337, 1340 (7th Cir. 1974) (dic-
tum), and thus may be insufficient in the context of a parole release
proceeding. See notes 154-59, 166-67 infra and accompanying text. Fur-
thermore, the APA does not guarantee all procedural safeguards, partic-
ularly those that have little relationship to the ability of a court to re-
view an agency decision. Cf. Dorado v. Kerr, 454 F.2d 892 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 934 (1972). Thus, the judiciary must intervene to
ensure the development of adequate procedural safeguards for prisoners.
4. The availability of specific procedures in federal prisons will be
highlighted because the impact of United States Board of Parole practices
has been documented much more thoroughly than has the impact of sini-
lar state practices. In addition, the procedural rules promulgated by the
Board are generally more progressive than state parole board rules. Data
regarding the efficacy of certain federal procedures support making those
procedures available on the state level as well.
5. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). Analysis
of due process rights and the protections afforded an individual under
the fifth amendment parallels the ratiocination of fourteenth amendment
procedural due process claims. See, e.g., Childs v. United States Bd. of
Parole, 511 F.2d 1270, 1277-84 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
The Supreme Court has frequently stated that the threatened depri-
vation must constitute a "grievous loss." E.g., Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concur-
ring). This language is hazy at best, however, and the courts generally
have assumed that denial of parole inflicts a grievous loss on the pris-
oner. In Childs v. United States Bd. of Parole, 511 F.2d 1270, 1278 (D.C.
Cir. 1974), for example, the court resolved the "grievous loss" issue in
one paragraph of discussion. Recognition of parole denial as a "grievous
loss" is appropriate because prisoners justifiably perceive the release de-




according to the Court, are "broad and majestic terms" that must
be flexibly defined.6 It consequently has rejected the theory
that procedural due process applies only when a petitioner has
claimed a right as opposed to a privilege.7
In light of the breadth of protection embodied in these
amendments, the Court has established that "a prisoner is not
wholly stripped of constitutional protections when he is im-
prisoned for crime. There is no iron curtain drawn between the
Constitution and the prisons of this country." Procedural
claims have therefore been upheld in several decision-making
contexts, some of which resemble parole release proceedings. The
results reached by the Court with respect to each of these situa-
tions provide a background against which the argument of a
potential parolee can be considered. 9
In Morrissey v. Brewer10 the Supreme Court observed that
6. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972). For exam-
ple, the term "liberty" denotes not only freedom from bodily restraint
but also the right of the individual to engage in any of the common occu-
pations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, and to establish
a home and raise children. Id. at 572.
7. "[T]he Court has fully and finally rejected the wooden distinc-
tion between 'rights' and 'privileges' that once seemed to govern the ap-
plication of procedural due process rights." Id. at 571.
8. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974).
9. Since procedural due process is required in a hearing where pro-
bation may be revoked and a deferred sentence imposed, Mempa v.
Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967), the similarity between parole release and de-
ferred sentencing merits some attention. Parole release has been analo-
gized to deferred sentencing because the parole board considers the same
factors as the sentencing judge, and its determination has the same effect
as the judge's decision. Menechino v. Oswald, 430 F.2d 403, 414 (2d Cir.
1970) (Feinberg, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1023 (1971); Hear-
ings on H.R. 13118 Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 15, pt. 7, at 194 (1972) (testimony of Pro-
fessor Robert Dawson, University of Texas Law School) [hereinafter
cited as Hearings on H.R. 13118]. The majority in Menechino rejected
this analogy, however, and concluded that the need for counsel, at least,
is much more urgent in the deferred sentencing context, since there the
right to appeal and the right to revoke a guilty plea are available. 430
F.2d at 409. The attitude of the Supreme Court is revealed in Warden
v. Marrero, 417 U.S. 653 (1974), where the Court distinguished the parole
release decision from that of the sentencing judge who effectively deter-
mines when an inmate will first become eligible for parole:
[T]he District Judge, at the time of sentencing, [finally] de-
termines [whether and] when the offender will become eli-
gible for consideration for parole and the Board's action simply
implements that determination.... [T]he parole decision...
is made long after the "prosecution" terminates ....
Id. at 659 (emphasis in original). See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,
480 (1972) ("[p]arole arises after the end of the criminal prosecution,
including imposition of sentence").
10. 408 U.S. 471, 477 (1972).
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parole, an "integral part of the penological system," is something
much more than an "ad hoc exercise of clemency," and held that
due process applies to parole revocation proceedings. The Court
articulated a fairly comprehensive list of procedures that must
be observed both at the preliminary hearing (held to determine
whether there is probable cause to suspect that parole conditions
have been violated) and at the actual parole revocation hear-
ing.' The spectrum of rights applicable to parole revocation
proceedings applies to probation revocation proceedings as
well.12 The prisoner subject to disciplinary proceedings, how-
ever, can claim the benefit of fewer due process protections than
the parolee or probationer. In Wolf v. McDonnel l the Su-
preme Court held that only two procedural rights must be uncon-
ditionally recognized by prison officials seeking to revoke an
inmate's good-time credit:' 4 the right to advance notice of
charges and the right to a written statement of reasons for the
action taken. Other procedural protections were either lim-
ited' 5 or not guaranteed at all.1 6 Thus, the Court has accorded
recognition to claims to some degree of process in several correc-
tions instances, but the number of safeguards that it has required
has varied with the nature of each proceeding.
B. EXTENSION OF PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS TO POTENTIAL PAROLEES
1. Deprivation of Liberty
Liberty is so important an interest that its enjoyment need
not be absolute to warrant due process protection. A prisoner
11. The parolee is entitled to (a) written notice of the claimed vio-
lations of parole, (b) disclosure of the evidence against him, (c) an op-
portunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and document-
ary evidence, (d) an opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse
witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically find good cause for not
allowing confrontation), (e) a neutral and detached hearing body, and
(f) a written statement by the factfinder as to the evidence relied on
and the reasons for revoking parole. Id. at 489.
12. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 773 (1973).
13. 418 U.S. 539, 563-65 (1974).
14. "Good time" is the sentence reduction granted to inmates who
have been on good behavior during a portion of their prison term.
15. The prisoner's opportunity to call witnesses, to present docu-
mentary evidence, and to receive written findings regarding the evidence
relied on to justify disciplinary action may be denied by prison officials
if they believe that such procedures would threaten personal or institu-
tional safety. Id. at 565-69.
16. The Court refused to extend to prisoners an opportunity to con-
front and cross-examine adverse witnesses, and to have counsel present
during disciplinary proceedings. Id. at 567-70.
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on parole is subject to supervision, yet revocation of his limited
freedom must satisfy procedural due process because a parolee
enjoys "many of the core values of unqualified liberty."17
Several courts have held that an inmate seeking parole,
unlike a parolee, presently enjoys no freedom and therefore is
not entitled to the protection of the fourteenth or fifth amend-
ments.'8 Before Morrissey, the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit advanced this argument as an alternative ground for de-
nying procedural due process to the prisoner seeking parole in
Menechino v. Oswald.19 And in United States ex rel. Bey v. Con-
necticut State Board of Parole2" the same court observed that
"[i]t is not sophistic to attach greater importance to a person's
justifiable reliance on maintaining his conditional freedom . ..
than to his mere anticipation or hope of freedom." Quoting -this
language in Morrissey,21 the Supreme Court may have been im-
pressed by the "present enjoyment" rationale; although Morris-
sey concerned parole revocation, the opinion might be read as
minimizing the liberty interest of a potential parolee. 22 The Sec-
ond Circuit, at least, in United States ex rel. Johnson v. Chairman
of New York State Board of Parole23 subsequently disavowed any
such interpretation of its statement in Bey:
We recognize that in Morrissey the Supreme Court referred
in a footnote to our language in United States ex rel. Bey v. Con-
necticut .... But this hardly indicates that due process is to
be applied to parole revocation merely because the conditional
freedom was presently being enjoyed .... The Court was
17. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972). The parolee may
have been on parole for a number of years and may have formed poten-
tially long-lasting employment and social relationships. Id.
18. This argument stems from the statement in Board of Regents
v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576 (1972), that "the Fourteenth Amendment's pro-
cedural protection of property is a safeguard of the security of interests
that a person has already acquired in specific benefits." The argument
was embraced for the purpose of distinguishing parole release and parole
revocation in Scarpa v. United States Bd. of Parole, 477 F.2d 278, 282
(5th Cir.) (en banc), vacated and remanded for consideration of moot-
ness, 414 U.S. 809 (1973); and United States ex rel. Bey v. Connecticut
State Bd. of Parole, 443 F.2d 1079, 1086 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot, 404
U.S. 879 (1971).
19. 430 F.2d 403, 408 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1023
(1971).
20. 443 F.2d 1079, 1086 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot, 404 U.S. 879
(1971).
21. 408 U.S. at 482 n.8.
22. United States ex rel. Johnson v. Chairman of N.Y. State Bd. of
Parole, 500 F.2d 925, 936 (2d Cir.) (dissenting opinion), vacated as moot
sub nom. Regan v. Johnson, 419 U.S. 1015 (1974).
23. Id. at 927-28 n.2 (majority opinion).
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simply reinforcing its point that conditional liberty permits much
greater freedom ... than does confinement in prison.
Basing its decision on a broad reading of Morrissey, the court
went on to reject the "present enjoyment" concept 24 it had ad-
vanced in Menechino as a variation of the thoroughly discredited
right-privilege dichotomy, and held that procedural due process
was required in parole release hearings.
That the Supreme Court in WoZff v. McDonnell did not con-
sider "present enjoyment" before extending procedural safe-
guards to prison disciplinary proceedings may further undermine
the relevance of the concept in due process inquiries. Had a
"present enjoyment" test been applied, the prisoner would likely
have been denied procedural protection, since deprivation of good
time affects the length of confinement 25 but not the present en-
joyment of liberty. Rather, the Court observed that, barring seri-
ous misconduct, each prisoner was statutorily entitled to good-
time credit26 and held that procedural due process was required
because of this entitlement alone.
Since the Constitution guarantees due process upon the
deprivation of a protected interest,2 7 and since it is easier to
perceive the deprivation of an interest that is presently enjoyed,
the "present enjoyment" concept might understandably be
thought to have constitutional significance. Nevertheless, in
other contexts the Supreme Court has refused to embrace the
concept as a prerequisite to establishing the necessary depriva-
tion.28  Indeed, the notion of "present enjoyment" is somewhat
24. Id. The "present enjoyment" concept has been vigorously at-
tacked in Bradford v. Weinstein, 519 F.2d 728, 731-32 (4th Cir. 1974), va-
cated as moot, 96 S. Ct. 347 (1975) (per curiam), and Childs v. United
States Bd. of Parole, 511 F.2d 1270, 1278 (:D.C. Cir. 1974), as well.
25. When a prison administrator rescinds a day of good time, the
duration of confinement is extended one full day.
26. 418 U.S. at 557.
27. "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law. .. ." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV;
accord, id. amend. V.
28. See, e.g., Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958) (procedural
due process required where appellants had been denied tax exemptions
because they had refused to subscribe to loyalty oaths); Schware v.
Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957) (procedural due process
required before state may exercise its discretion to deny an applicant
the opportunity to qualify for the practice of law); Goldsmith v. United
States Bd. of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117 (1926) (notice and a hearing
required before the Board of Tax Appeals could exercise its discretion
to grant or deny application for admission to practice before the Board
because CPA was within the class of those entitled to such admission).
Notwithstanding the position of the Supreme Court, the "present enjoy-
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illusory. As the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit postulated in Childs v. United States Board of Parole,2 9
parole revocation is a highly visible deprivation of liberty be-
cause it involves "taking away"; parole denial, on the other hand,
involves "refus[ing] to grant,"30 but is nonetheless an equally
potent deprivation. Thus, denial of parole affects the prisoner
in much the same way as revocation of parole, to which due proc-
ess rights attach. In both situations, a favorable decision by the
parole board results in conditional liberty and a negative deci-
sion results in incarceration.31
The taint created by certain types of government action
against an individual also may constitute a deprivation of liberty.
An employee can demand procedural protection when the state
damages his standing in the community by declining to reemploy
him, for "[t]o be deprived not only of present government
employment but of future opportunity for it certainly is no small
injury .... ,"32 The threat of stigmatization is more important
to a potential parolee than to a government employee, since an
initial negative parole board decision may adversely affect sub-
sequent release determinations and thus perpetuate his literal
imprisonment.
33
ment" rationale, in the context of parole release proceedings, was adopted
in two circuit courts of appeals decisions. Scarpa v. United States Bd.
of Parole, 477 F.2d 278, 282 (5th Cir.) (en banc), vacated and remanded
for consideration of mootness, 414 U.S. 809 (1973); Menechino v. Oswald,
430 F.2d 403, 408-09 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1023 (1971).
29. 511 F.2d 1270 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
30. Id. at 1277-78. Similarly, a child is generally considered de-
prived or underprivileged if he lacks educational opportunities. The
child need not have been initially exposed to those opportunities.
31. Id.
32. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 574 (1972). It appears
that the stigma must have at least a substantial adverse effect; although
what exactly the Court meant by "substantial" is unclear, in Roth it re-
quired something more than making the applicant "somewhat less at-
tractive to some other employers." Id. at 574 n.13.
33. Bradford v. Weinstein, 519 F.2d 728, 732 (1974), vacated as
moot, 96 S. Ct. 347 (1975) (per curiam). In some cases, a negative deci-
sion means that the inmate must wait three years before he is reconsid-
ered for parole. See Rules of the United States Board of Parole, 28
C.F.R. § 2.14(c) (1975).
The impact of parole denial on subsequent hearings merits consider-
ation even though a prisoner may not be stigmatized in the eyes of all
parole board members. Cf. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433
(1971). In Constantineau a statute provided for "posting" the name of
any person who "by excessive drinking" exposed himself or his family
"to want" or became "dangerous to the peace." The Supreme Court held
that to label an individual by "posting" his name so stigmatizes him in
the eyes of some members of the community that he must be given no-
tice and an opportunity to be heard prior to the "posting."
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In any event, the deprivation of liberty that results from
denial of parole must be analyzed in light of the Supreme Court's
statement that "there can be no doubt that the meaning of 'lib-
erty' must be broad indeed. '34 Not only does it follow that a
prisoner retains a residuum of constitutional rights even though
he has been placed behind bars; 35 the Court's statement also sug-
gests that if the government seeks to deny a prisoner any aspect
of this remaining liberty, it must accord him the protection of
procedural due process.
2. Deprivation of Property
A prisoner's interest in parole release might also be charac-
terized as property, in view of the breadth the Supreme Court
has ascribed to that term. It is evident that property for pur-
poses of due process analysis is not limited to conventional inter-
rests such as those in real estate, chattels, or money.3" "[Prop-
erty interests] are created and their dimensions are defined by
existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent
source such as state law-rules or understandings that secure
certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those
benefits. '37 Thus, the existence of a property interest is deter-
mined by examining the basis for a particular claim, rather than
the nature of the particular benefit sought.38
Some courts have suggested that procedural due process is
inapposite in parole release proceedings because no statute guar-
antees parole and therefore the prisoner cannot advance a claim
34. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972).
35. "The restraints and the punishment which a criminal conviction
entails do not place the citizen beyond the ethical tradition that accords
respect to the dignity and intrinsic worth of every individual. 'Liberty'
and 'custody' are not mutually exclusive concepts." United States ex
rel. Miller v. Twomey, 479 F.2d 701, 712 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 1146 (1974). See also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (a child,
even though traditionally considered to be in the custody of the state
as parens patriae, may claim certain procedural protections in a hearing
to adjudicate his delinquency).
"Every prisoner's liberty is, of course, circumscribed by the very fact
of his confinement, but his interest in the limited liberty left to him is
then only the more substantial." Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 594(1974) (Douglas, J., concurring and dissenting).
36. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571-72 (1972).
37. Id. at 577. The "entitlement" concept has been justifiably at-
tacked as discrimination between persons claiming "rights" and those
claiming "privileges." See Comment, Entitlement, Enjoyment and Due
Process of Law, 1974 DuKE L.J. 89, 98-99.
38. See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
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of entitlement. 9 By narrowly construing the nature of entitle-
ment, these courts have ignored the breadth of the property con-
cept articulated by the Supreme Court. A claim of entitlement,
to be cognizable for due process purposes, can rest on less than
a statutory guarantee of a particular result.40 Thus, a cognizable
claim of entitlement is embodied in the parole process in the form
of both a statutory right to consideration for parole and an expec-
tation of, or a conditional entitlement to, release.
Consideration for parole is guaranteed by statute in virtually
all jurisdictions.4 1  Since these statutes "support claims of
entitlement" to consideration for parole release, it ineluctably
follows from the Court's analysis that they create a protected
property interest. An inmate within the statutorily defined class
of those eligible to be considered for parole is therefore entitled
to procedural due process. 42
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has based an
alternative theory in support of an inmate's property interest
in parole on the concept of "conditional entitlement." In United
States eX Tel. Johnson v. Chairman of New York State Board
of Parole43 that court suggested that a prisoner's expectation
of parole is so strong and realistic44 that it should be accorded
39. Scarpa v. United States Bd. of Parole, 477 F.2d 278, 282 (5th
Cir.) (en banc), vacated and remanded for consideration of mootness,
414 U.S. 809 (1973) (a prisoner has only a possibility of conditional free-
dom); Menechino v. Oswald, 430 F.2d 403, 408-09 (2d Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 1023 (1971) (a prisoner "is entitled only to be released
after full service of his sentence").
40. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); cases cited in note
31 supra. In Goldberg the Supreme Court based a property right on
a claim of entitlement to welfare benefits, the eligibility for which had
been defined by statute. The recipients had not actually shown that they
were within the statutory terms of eligibility, but the Court held that
they had a right to a hearing at which they might attempt to do so.
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (discussing Goldberg).
Thus, it is clear that entitlement encompasses a claim to benefits and
that proof of an absolute right to those benefits is unnecessary. Any
other interpretation of "entitlement" would appear to be inconsistent
with the rejection of the right-privilege dichotomy, because privileges
and "less than absolute entitlements" are strikingly similar constructs.
41. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 4202, 4203(a) (1970). All the states have some
form of parole statutes for the discretionary release of prisoners, al-
though a few prisoners are never eligible for release because of the egre-
gious nature of their crimes. Newman, Court Intervention in the Parole
Process, 36 AaBANY L. REv. 257 (1972).
42. See Bradford v. Weinstein, 519 F.2d 728, 731-32 (4th Cir. 1974),
vacated as moot, 96 S. Ct. 347 (1975) (per curiam).
43. 500 F.2d 925 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot sub nom. Regan v. John-
son, 419 U.S. 1015 (1974).
44. "Fifty-four percent of all prisoners released from prison in 1970
19761
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protection. Critics of this "expectancy" analysis have countered
that because the parole decision is discretionary and the outcome
is therefore not guaranteed, a prisoner's expectation must fall
short of entitlement to release. 45  The Supreme Court has
recognized in other contexts, however, that an expectation may
arise from an implied, as well as an express, agreement and has
protected that expectation so long as the implication of the agree-
ment is sufficiently objective to be understood by the parties
involved.46 In this respect, a prisoner's interest in parole is more
than a subjective expectancy, for most inmates are eventually
paroled.47  Indeed, the vast majority of initial parole applica-
. . . left as parolees. In New York the figure is even higher. In 1972,
• . . the New York State Parole Board released ... 75.4% of the [in-
mates in] cases coming before it." Id. at 928.
45. See, e.g., Menechino v. Oswald, 430 F.2d 403, 408 (2d Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1023 (1971).
46. "To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must
have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more
than a unilateral expectation of it." Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564, 577 (1972). See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (Ohio statute
directing local authorities to provide school-age children with a free edu-
cation fostered an expectancy that a School principal could suspend
pupils only "for cause" and hence created property and liberty inter-
ests in remaining in school even though the statute did not include a
"for cause" requirement); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972)
(faculty guide stating that the administration of a college wanted a
teacher to feel that he had tenure so long as his teaching services were
satisfactory constituted an understanding similar to an implied contract
that dismissal would not follow cooperative and satisfactory performance
on the part of the teacher and therefore created a property interest in
employment notwithstanding his lack of Iormal tenure).
An implied agreement is exemplified in the parole revocation con-
text: "Implicit in the system's concern with parole violations is the no-
tion that the parolee is entitled to retain his liberty as long as he sub-
stantially abides by the conditions of his parole." Morrissey v. Brewer,
408 U.S. 471, 479 (1972). Although the implicit promise in Morrissey
went to the creation of protected "conditional liberty," a property inter-
est arguably was imbedded in the parolee's claim. Because property
rights are a function of certainty of possession rather than the nature
of what is possessed, a person may have a property interest in liberty.
47. In 1970, state boards paroled anywhere from two to 97 percent
of the prisoners who petitioned for release. The average rate of release
among the states was 57 percent. Hearings on H.R. 13118, supra note
9, at 222 (testimony of Don Gottfredson, Program Director, National
Council on Crime and Delinquency Research Center). It must be em-
phasized that these are annual figures. Ninety-seven percent of all pris-
oners eventually return to society and for every 10 that leave prison,
nine do so by virtue of a parole board decision. Id. at 85 (testimony
of Professor Leonard Orland, University of Connecticut Law School).
Moreover, parole as a method of release from prison has increased stead-
ily over the last several years. Id. at 222 (testimony of Don Gottfredson,




tions are granted.48 Parole board discretion has become increas-
ingly limited by the use in board deliberations of objective cri-
teria and statistical aids,49 which allow the prisoner to more ac-
curately determine the likelihood of his release. As the Supreme
Court noted in Morrissey, "the practice of releasing prisoners on
parole before the end of their sentences has become an integral
part of the penological system." 0
The concrete expectation creating a "conditional entitle-
ment" to parole may be analogized to the protected "conditional
liberty" of the parolee who has been released. The parolee's lib-
erty is premised on his accepting and abiding by the restrictions
of parole.' The prisoner's legitimate anticipation of release
stems not only from statistical probability,52 but also from the
policy that parole will be granted unless it is shown that such
action would jeopardize the community or retard rehabilitation
of the inmate.53 Because the parole release decision is sufficiently
objective to create an expectation of, or conditional entitle-
ment to, release, the potential parolee's interest merits due
process protection.
In the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in Morrissey
to grant procedural rights in parole revocation proceedings, six
circuit courts of appeals have discussed the relationship of due
process and parole release. Five of them have so interpreted the
48. Menechino v. Oswald, 430 F.2d 403, 416 n.16 (2d Cir. 1970) (dis-
senting opinion), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1023 (1971).
49. To "promote a more consistent exercise of discretion," the
United States Board of Parole uses statistical parole experience tables
to help determine whether a prisoner is ready to reenter society. 28
C.F.R. § 2.20 (1975). Such statistical determinations now control almost
all initial parole release decisions. Project-Parole Release Decision-
making and the Sentencing Process, 84 YALE L.J. 810, 825 (1975) [here-
inafter cited as Parole Release Decisionmaking].
50. 408 U.S. at 477 (emphasis added). Antonin Scalia, Chairman
of the Administrative Conference of the United States, has indicated:
Parole cannot be viewed as simply a windfall, because in fact
the entire penal system is premised on its availability. Con-
gress prescribes maximum sentences and judges sentence indi-
vidual defendants with the knowledge that parole is available
.... Grants of parole are not a series of random acts, but a
major and regular part of the administration of our system of
criminal justice.
Hearings on H.R. 1598 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties,
and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
93d Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 25, at 163-64 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Hear-
ings on the Parole Reorganization Act].
51. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972).
52. See notes 47-48 supra and accompanying text.
53. See, e.g., 28 C.F.R. §§ 2.13(b), 2.18 (1975).
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constitutional concepts of liberty and property 5 4 to require due
process protection in release proceedings. 5  These courts have
rejected the "present enjoyment" concept and have affirmed the
strength of the prisoner's liberty interest in parole release. They
additionally have found property interests embodied in the in-
mate's statutory right to consideration for parole and his objec-
tive expectation of release. In sum, these courts have properly
concluded that because denial of parole constitutes a significant
deprivation of liberty and property, parole release proceedings
must meet the standards of due process.
II. THE PROCESS THAT IS DUE IN PAROLE
RELEASE HEARINGS
Concluding that some process is required in parole release
54. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972).
55. The courts of appeals in United States ex rel. Richerson v.
Wolff, 525 F.2d 797 (7th Cir. 1975), United States ex rel. Johnson v.
Chairman of N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 500 F.2d 925 (2d Cir.), vacated
as moot sub nom. Regan v. Johnson, 419 U.S. 1015 (1974), and Childs
v. United States Bd. of Parole, 511 F.2d 1270 (D.C. Cir. 1974), invoked
the due process clause to require parole boards to provide a prisoner
with a statement of the reasons for the denial of parole. The Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recognized the potential parolee's right
to due process but did not determine the scope of that right. Bradford
v. Weinstein, 519 F.2d 728 (4th Cir. 1974), vacated as moot, 96 S. Ct. 347
(1975) (per curiam). In Mower v. Britton, 504 F.2d 396 (10th Cir. 1975),
the Tenth Circuit applied section 555 (e) of the APA to require a brief
statement of the grounds on which parole had been denied. While the
court did not reach the constitutional issues, it nevertheless suggested
that a strong argument could be made that some degree of due process
should be accorded the potential parolee. Id. at 397.
The protected status of a prisoner requesting parole technically re-
mains in doubt, however, for several earlier circuit court opinions unfa-
vorable to his status have not been explicitly overruled. E.g., Madden
v. New Jersey State Parole Bd., 438 F.2d 1189 (3d Cir. 1971). See also
Scarpa v. United States Bd. of Parole, 477 F.2d 278 (5th Cir.) (en banc),
vacated and remanded for considerations of mootness, 414 U.S. 809
(1973); Dorado v. Kerr, 454 F.2d 892 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
934 (1972). But cf. Clutchette v. Procurder, 497 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1974),
cert. granted sub nom. Enomoto v. Clutchette, 420 U.S. 1010 (1975).
While the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Menechino v. Os-
wald, 430 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1023 (1971), had
denied procedural due process to a prisoner seeking parole, it subse-
quently decided that because the Supreme Court's rejection of the right-
privilege dichotomy cast grave doubt on the validity of Menechino, an
inmate denied parole must be provided a written statement of the rea-
sons for the parole board's decision. United States ex rel. Johnson v.
Chairman of N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 501) F.2d 925, 927-28 & n.2 (2d Cir.),
vacated as moot sub nom. Regan v. Johnson, 419 U.S. 1015 (1974). Mene-
chino was not overruled but was limited to the principle that when an




proceedings makes it necessary to determine the number and
type of procedural safeguards that must be made available to
the potential parolee. The courts have used a balancing tech-
nique to resolve the extent to which procedural due process must
be observed in a particular context:
[C]onsideration of what procedures due process may require
under any given set of circumstances must begin with a deter-
mination of the precise nature of the government function
involved as well as of the private interest that has been affected
by governmental action.56
Because the correctional system seeks to accomplish both
custody-security and treatment-rehabilitation, objectives that
sometimes diverge, 5 a balancing technique seems to be an
appropriate method of determining the rights of prisoners.
The strength and nature of the prisoner's interest in parole
as well as the several significant government interests suggest
that a wide range of procedural protections is appropriate in pa-
role release proceedings. With respect to the prisoner, it is obvi-
ous that his interest in parole is intense; no concern occupies more
of his time.58 The Supreme Court described this interest as a
matter "of obvious great moment" in Wolff 59 and reiterated its
importance in Morrissey," holding that revocation proceedings
must incorporate a substantial measure of process. Since denial
of parole might delay release for so long as three years,61 an
effect parallel in significance to reincarceration, Morrissey can
be relied on as analogous support for a wide range of procedures
in the release context as well.62
56. Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886,
895 (1961).
57. Hearings on H.R. 13118, supra note 9, at 81 (testimony of Pro-
fessor Leonard Orland, University of Connecticut Law School).
58. "In the fall and winter of 1971-72, the subcommittee visited jails
and prisons in five States and the District of Columbia, talking to hun-
dreds of prisoners and corresponding with hundreds of others. One is-
sue, one concern, has loomed above all others and that is parole." Hear-
ings on the Parole Reorganization Act, supra note 50, at 125 (comments
of Representative Robert Kastenmeier). "[P]arole has far more im-
portance than the other aspects of an institutional operation-the food,
the clothing, the medical care." Id. at 210 (testimony of Norman
Carlson, Director, Federal Bureau of Prisons). "[P]arole is the over-
whelming consideration for every prisoner." Id. at 359 (testimony of
James Bennett, former Director, United States Bureau of Prisons).
59. 418 U.S. at 560.
60. See 408 U.S. at 482.
61. See Rules of the United States Board of Parole, 28 C.F.R. § 2.14(c) (1975).
62. The immediate impact of a negative parole decision distin-
guishes that determination from the disciplinary revocation of good-time
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The government, too, will advance its own significant inter-
ests if procedural safeguards are incorporated in the parole re-
lease process. It might not be immediately evident that interests
in rehabilitating criminals 8 and maintaining order within pris-
ons" would be advanced by such safeguards; but, because
persons who perceive that correctional authorities have treated
them unfairly are likely to resist rehabilitation or become disrup-
tive,6 5 even the appearance of fairness should produce a desir-
able stabilizing effect. Moreover, the possibility of rehabilitation
deteriorates as the government incarcerates the prisoner year af-
ter year.36 Such considerations led the Supreme Court to con-
clude that substantial procedural protection in parole revocation
proceedings will "enhance the chance of rehabilitation by avoid-
ing reactions to arbitrariness." 67
The government might nevertheless assert several other
interests in seeking to deny a wide range of procedural protec-
tions to the potential parolee. Valid concerns for the prevention
of disruption and the manageability of the parole process argu-
ably require release proceedings to be unencumbered by proce-
dural niceties more appropriate in other contexts. Thus, the Su-
preme Court found that important government interests in "law
and order" and in "manageability" might be frustrated if a wide
range of procedural requirements were imposed on prison dis-
ciplinary proceedings.68 And it reached this conclusion notwith-
credit as characterized by the majority in Wolff v. McDonnell. Since
good-time credit can be restored by prison officials, the Court reasoned,
its revocation might not affect the actual date of parole or extend the
maximum term to be served. The Court concluded that because restora-
tion of credit was possible, the prisoner's interest in its immediate reten-
tion lessened in significance. 418 U.S. at 560-61. By contrast, although
parole release might be granted after iL is once denied, the short-term
consequences of a denial are immediate and irreversible. Indeed, a
prisoner may wait so long as three years for a second hearing. See note
33 supra.
The Court has implicitly recognized the importance of a parole re-
lease decision by acknowledging the significance of a sentencing judge's
parole eligibility decision as the first step leading to parole release. See
Warden v. Marrero, 417 U.S. 653, 659, 662-63 (1974).
63. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 484 (1972).
64. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 562-63 (1974).
65. PREsIENT's CominssioN ON Lw ENFORCEmENT AND ADmImNs-
TRATioN OF Jusrrcs, TASK FORCE REPORT: CoRRECTiONs 83 (1967) [here-
inafter cited as TAsx FORCE REPORT].
66. See Heaings on H.R. 13118, supra note 9, at 609 (comments of
Representative Abner Mikva).
67. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 484 (1972) (citing TAsK
FORCE REPORT, supra note 65, at 83, 88).
68. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 561-63 (1974).
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standing its observations that such proceedings are conducted
against a background of "frustration, resentment and despair"6 9
and that, in such a milieu, "[w]ith some, rehabilitation may be
best achieved by simulating procedures of a free society."70
But prevention of disruption, while obviously desirable, is
a broad construct that can interfere with a reasoned analysis
of a particular problem. Thus, it is inaccurate to analogize parole
release proceedings to disciplinary proceedings, for it is question-
able whether similar government interests would be frustrated
if parole release incorporated substantial procedural safeguards.
Unlike disciplinary proceedings, which in the Court's view
often require "swift and sure" punishment to prevent disrup-
tion,7 1 parole release proceedings serve a number of interests of
which the prevention of disruption is but one. In fact, sensitive
institutional issues rarely receive much attention at hearings con-
ducted under the federal Parole Board Guidelines.7 2 Certainly,
a prisoner who is denied parole might become frustrated and
even disruptive, but this is hardly a reason for denying him a
significant number of procedural safeguards. If anything, it sug-
gests that the appearance of fairness embodied in such proce-
dures becomes all the more important.
With respect to manageability, it seems indisputable that
additional procedural safeguards would lengthen parole release
proceedings and render them more costly, although the extent to
which time and expense would increase is problematical.73 It
69. Id. at 562.
70. Id. at 563.
71. This recommendation of "swift and sure" punishment is ques-
tionable even in the disciplinary context. The majority supports its be-
lief by referring to A. BAxDuRA, PIucIPrLEs OF BEHAVIOR MoDIFIcATION
(1969); L. KnAsmm & L. ULLmANN, RESEARcH IN BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION
(1965); and B. SKImNER, SCIENCE AND HUAN BEHAVIOR (1953). Wolff
v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563 n.14 (1974). The evidence on which the
dissenters relies is more persuasive, for it reflects the experience of cor-
rections officials who have incorporated due process safeguards in disci-
plinary hearings and who have observed no significant effect on prison
safety or security. Instead, the quality of hearings was upgraded and
inmate feelings of powerlessness and frustration were relieved. Id. at
588-89 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing ABA CommnssioN ON CoanEc-
TioNAL FAcILinEs AND SERVIcEs, SurvEv or PRISON DiscIPLIuARY PRAcTIcEs
Aim PRocEDuRES 21-22 (1974); TASK FORCE: REPORT, supra note 65, at 13,
82-83).
72. Parole Release Decisionmaking, supra note 47, at 853.
73. Parole Board hearings last 10 to 15 minutes on the average.
Hearings on H.R. 13118, supra note 9 at 579. The Second Circuit has
asserted that the expansion of procedural guarantees would prolong re-
lease deliberations and require appropriations for additional manpower.
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is difficult to see, however, how these burdens could outweigh
the prisoner's interest in a particular procedure. Time, of course,
is inextricably bound up with expense. And the state's financial
interest has generally been discounted where due process is at
stake.74 Discounting this interest seems especially appropriate
here, because parole has been the most poorly financed aspect
of the corrections system7 5 Moreover, if safeguards did result
in speedier release, the change might pay for itself.76
As a general proposition, then, maximization of procedural
protections in parole release proceedings should follow from the
contrast between prisoner interests of substantial strength and
government interests of questionable applicability. The Supreme
Court in Morrissey v. Brewer relied on a broad perspective of
private and government interests as a basis for determining what
procedural safeguards were required before parole revocation.
Similarly, the preceding overview will be employed to ascertain
the desirability of specific procedures 77 and thus to evaluate the
federal regulations governing parole release proceedings.
Menechino v. Oswald, 430 F.2d 403, 409-10 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 1023 (1971).
74. "The least weighty of these interests in the procedural due proc-
ess scale is thrift." Clutchette v. Procunier, 497 F.2d 809, 816 (9th Cir.
1974), cert. granted sub nom. Enomoto v. Clutchette, 420 U.S. 1010(1975). See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (drain on fiscal re-
sources alone could not overcome an individual's- interest in a hearing
prior to termination of welfare benefits). But cf. Ortwein v. Schwab,
410 U.S. 656 (1973). In Ortwein the Court upheld a $25 appellant's fil-
ing fee, perhaps thereby precluding welfare claimants from obtaining ju-
dicial review of administrative findings. The state's interest in conserv-
ing its financial resources was the only justification advanced for imposi-
tion of the fee-other than the supposition that such fees deter frivolous
claims.
75. See F. Cohen, The Legal Challenge to Corrections (consultant's
paper for the Joint Commission on Correctional Manpower and Train-
ing), reprinted in part in Hearings on H.R. 13118, supra note 9, at 1030,
1034 (only 3.5 percent of all correctional appropriations are spent on the
adult parole system).
76. Maintaining a parolee is roughly 17 percent as expensive as
maintaining a prisoner. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 65, at 194.
77. Six of the seven due process elements required in parole revoca-
tion proceedings will be examined. Application of other procedural pro-
tections to parole release proceedings may well be warranted, but pri-
mary consideration should be accorded those "minimum requisites of due
process" outlined in Morrissey and Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778(1973) (probation revocation). Because parole release decisions are al-
ways made by a parole board or its representative examiners, Newman,




A. OPPORTUx= To BE HEARD AND To PRESENT WnESSES
Am DocuimNTARY EvmEmC
The rules of the United States Board of Parole ensure a
hearing to federal prisoners eligible for parole.78 At this pro-
ceeding, hearing examiners must discuss with the inmate his
institutional conduct and a statistical evaluation of his readiness
for release.70 The potential parolee is unable to present wit-
nesses on his behalf,80 but may include documentary evidence
in his application for parole.81 Although excluded from the
hearing itself, "attorneys, relatives, or interested parties wishing
a personal interview to discuss a specific case with a representa-
tive of the Board of Parole" may secure such an interview on
written request.82
Since these rules guarantee the inmate an opportunity to be
heard, they appear to satisfy the "fundamental requisite of due
process."8 3 Moreover, since they allow the prisoner to express
himself orally, they appear to satisfy the more precise require-
ment, articulated by the Supreme Court in Goldberg v. Kelly,
that such an opportunity be "tailored to the capacities and cir-
cumstances of those who are to be heard. '8 4 In that case, the
Court held that welfare recipients were entitled not only to be
heard but also to present evidence orally before their benefits
78. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 2.13, 2.14 (1975). In 1973, all but three states
provided a hearing to prisoners seeking parole. NATIONAL ADVISORY CoM-
MSSION ON CRmTAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, CORRECTIONS 400
(1973). In four states, parole boards screened the files of eligible prison-
ers and heard only those cases that merited further consideration. Id.
79. 28 C.F.R. § 2.13 (a) (1975). The statistical evaluation is derived
from guidelines quantifying the severity of the offense and the potential
risk of a parole violation. See id. § 2.20. See also note 49 supra.
80. In 17 states, witnesses for the prisoner may appear at the parole
hearing. O'Leary & Nuffield, A National Survey of Parole Decision-mak-
ing, 19 CRIME & DELi. 378, 387 (1973).
81. Prisoners must be furnished with an inmate background state-
ment for completion prior to the initial hearing. 40 Fed. Reg. 41,332
(1975) (to be codified as 28 C.F.R. § 2.11(d)). This form permits the
prisoner to present his version of facts that the hearing examiners des-
ignate as material to the potential risk of parole violation. Id. at 41,328
(discussion of rule changes by Maurice Sigler, Chairman, United States
Board of Parole).
82. 28 C.F.R. § 2.22 (1975). "The Board encourages the submission
of... [all available relevant and pertinent] information by interested
persons." Id. § 2.21. And in almost all states the inmate's counsel, fam-
ily, and acquaintances may consult with board members before the pa-
role hearing. O'Leary & Nuffield, supra note 80, at 387.
83. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267 (1970) (quoting Grannis
v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914)).
84. Id. at 268-69.
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were terminated. It reasoned that many recipients had difficulty
writing effectively and would be unable in a written presentation
to adapt their arguments for eligibility to issues that the decision-
maker might regard as important., 5 Since the recipient's credi-
bility was at stake, the Court observed, an oral presentation
assumed even greater importance. 86
On the other hand, insofar as the federal parole rules deny
the prisoner an opportunity to present witnesses at his parole
hearing, they may fail to meet constitutional standards. In the
parole revocation context of Morrissey v. Brewer, the Supreme
Court required that a parolee be accorded not only an opportun-
ity to confront his supervising officer and present documentary
evidence, but also an opportunity to call witnesses on his
behalf. 7  And in Wolff v. McDonnell, a prisoner charged with
serious misconduct was given the right to present witnesses as
well as documentary evidence before prison officials could impose
solitary confinement or deprive him of good-time credit.88 In
Wolff, however, the Court did place limits on the right to call
witnesses and to present documentary evidence: If prison offi-
cials determine that the exercise of those rights would jeopardize
institutional safety or correctional goals, they can exclude a par-
ticular witness from the hearing or restrict a prisoner's access
to sources of evidence.89
Goldberg, Morrissey, and Wolff suggest that the potential
parolee has a constitutional right not only to present his case
orally and to offer documentary evidence at a parole release
hearing, but also to call his own witnesses at that hearing. An
oral presentation is necessary because prisoners, like welfare
recipients, may be unable to effectively express themselves in
writing.90 And the opportunity to call witnesses is especially
crucial, since prisoners have a severe credibility problem.9 1
Indeed, their evidentiary needs are compelling:
Without [both the power to present documentary material and
summon witnesses], how can [the prisoner] corroborate his own
85. Id. at 269.
86. Id.
87. 408 U.S. at 487, 489.
88. 418 U.S. at 564.
89. Id. at 566. The Court considered it useful, but unnecessary, for
the disciplinary committee to state its reasons for refusing to call a wit-
ness. Id.
90. Hearings on H.R. 13118, supra note 9, at 344 (testimony of San-
ford Rosen, Assistant Legal Director, American Civil Liberties Union).
91. Clutchette v. Procunier, 497 F.2d 809, 818 (9th Cir. 1974), cert.
granted sub noam. Enomoto v. Clutchette, 420 U.S. 1010 (1975).
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story? Without corroboration, will the Board be likely to believe
him if his version of the facts is different from the prison's?
Suppose, for example, there is a notation in the file that he
attacked another prisoner. If he can merely deny it, will that
be likely to impress the Board? [The prisoner requires sup-
porting evidence and testimony.] 92
The interviews with interested persons that the federal rules
presently sanction are insufficient in this regard for two reasons.
First, the interview is conducted by staff personnel and not by
hearing examiners.93 Thus, the persons initially considering the
parole application do not see or hear the "witness" and are there-
fore unable to pass on the credibility of the testimony or
experience the full impact of a personal presentation. Second,
because the potential parolee is not present at the interview, he
has no opportunity to ensure that the views of the interested per-
son will be adequately presented to the staff representative. If
a prisoner were able to call witnesses at his parole release hear-
ing, not only could the hearing examiners confront the witnesses
and benefit from the full impact of their testimony, but the pris-
oner could be certain that nothing relevant to the release deter-
mination had been forgotten or excluded. In view of the urgency
of the prisoner's need to present his own witnesses, the govern-
ment must be able to demonstrate substantial countervailing in-
terests to succeed in denying him this opportunity or in limiting
it to personal interviews of interested persons by a representative
of the Board of Parole.
As previously suggested, the government can claim interests
in preventing disruption, maintaining manageability, and mini-
mizing costs, each or all of which may bear on the desirability
of a particular procedural safeguard. With respect to disruption,
it is difficult to see how allowing a prisoner to introduce affirma-
tive testimony about his readiness for parole would create an
unreasonable risk, if any risk at all. Since only those fellow
inmates who desired to testify would do so, neither their well-
being nor general prison security would be jeopardized. Even
in Wolff, where a majority of the Court speculated that an unre-
stricted right to call witnesses would create, in the context of
disciplinary hearings, the potential for disruption,94 there was a
92. Hearings on H.R. 13118, supra note 9, at 601 (testimony of Sena-
tor Charles Goodell, Chairman, Committee on the Study of Incarcera-
tion). Credibility may be pivotal because the Board in making its deter-
mination considers subjective factors, such as misconduct, 28 C.F.R.
§ 2.19 (f) (2) (ii) (1975), in addition to objective criteria.
93. 28 C.F.R. § 2.22 (1975).
94. 418 U.S. at 566.
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failure to explain or cite any authority for this belief. And
in any event, the Court did accord prisoners at least a qualified
right to call witnesses, as could be done here. Hence, particular
witnesses could be excluded or heard in camera if it is deter-
mined that their presence would jeopardize institutional security.
"Manageability," of course, is scarcely susceptible of reasoned
analysis in the absence of empirical evidence concerning what
might actually occur at hearings that include witnesses presented
by the prisoner. Certainly, such additional testimony would con-
sume more time and, as a result perhaps render parole release
hearings less manageable. But it seems more appropriate to ask
whether release hearings would become unmanageable, before
denying the prisoner a crucial safeguard. That is, to prevail, the
government should be required to establish by empirical proof
that the presence of these witnesses would be so burdensome as
to halt the release process or slow it down dramatically.
Whatever the appropriate weight for due process purposes
of the government's related interest in fiscal economy, the parole
board could prevent abuse of the right to call witnesses by pro-
hibiting cumulative or irrelevant testimony.95 And in any event,
it is unclear in the first instance that such a right would strain
the government's financial resources.0 6 Indeed, since such proce-
dures have rehabilitative potential,97 they seem consistent in sev-
eral respects with the interests of the government.
B. NoTIcE OF HEARING AN AcCESS TO THE EVIDENCE To BE
CONSIDERED BY THE BOARD
The federal parole rules require the Parole Board to notify
a federal prisoner of the time and place of his release hearing.98
These rules, which previously embodied a general policy of confi-
dentiality with respect to parole records,99 now reflect the
requirements of the Freedom of Information Act'00 and permit
95. For a similar suggestion in the context of disciplinary proceed-
ings, see Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 584 (1974) (Marshall, J., dis-
senting).
96. See note 76 supra and accompandng text.
97. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 65, at 83.
98. 28 C.F.R. § 2.12(a) (1975). A minority of states require that
a prisoner receive notice of the date and time of his parole release hear-
ing. See W. PArEm, PAROLE: OnlGiNs, DEVELOPmNT, CuREN PRAc-
TICES AND STATuTEs 57-188 (1972).
99. See 40 Fed. Reg. 10,974 (1975) (formerly codified as 28 C.F.R.
§ 2.12(b)); id. at 10,984 (formerly codified as 28 C.F.R. § 2.57(b)).
100. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1974).
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disclosure to the inmate of factual material bearing on his of-
fense, behavior, personal history, and institutional progress.10 1
The Freedom of Information Act contains a number of exemp-
tions, however, and the Board's new rules contain parallel restric-
tions on disclosure of a prisoner's file. 0 2 Information may be
withheld if its release would "(1) threaten the life or physical
safety of any person; (2) interfere with law enforcement pro-
ceedings; (3) disclose investigative techniques of a law enforce-
ment agency; or (4) constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion
of personal privacy.' 03
The Board's recent amendment of its rules is a welcome shift
from an emphasis on confidentiality, but broad exceptions to dis-
closure requirements ought not impair a parolee's access to infor-
mation. Thus, the exemptions must be analyzed in light of
several Supreme Court opinions in which disclosure has been re-
quired in related contexts. In revocation proceedings, for exam-
ple, the Court has required that an accused parolee be provided
a list of alleged parole violations, as well as notice of both his
preliminary probable cause and subsequent revocation heai-
ings.10 4 A parolee is also entitled to examine the evidence that
may be used against him during revocation proceedings. 105 Simi-
larly, in Wolff, the Court held that a prisoner charged with mis-
conduct must be given notice 24 hours before a disciplinary hear-
ing may be held.10 6 The alleged infraction of rules must be speci-
fied in this notice so that the accused prisoner will be able to pre-
101. 40 Fed. Reg. 41,342 (1975) (to be codified as 28 C.F.R. § 2.57
(a)). In contrast, the state prisoner generally is uninformed of the facts
that will be used against him. See PARKm, supra note 98, at 57-118.
102. 40 Fed. Reg. 41,328 (1975) (discussion of rule changes by Maur-
ice Sigler, Chairman, United States Board of Parole).
103. Id. at 41,342 (to be codified within 28 C.F.R. § 2.57 (a)).
The primary document in a prisoner's file is usually the presentence
investigation report. Administrative Conference of the United States,
Recommendation 72-3: Procedures of the United States Board of Parole,
June 9, 1972, reprinted in Hearings on the Parole Reorganization Act,
supra note 59, at 200. The court that sentenced the prisoner retains sole
authority to disclose the report. 40 Fed. Reg. 41,342 (1975) (to be codi-
fied as 28 C.F.R. § 2.57 (c)); id. at 41,328 (explanation by Maurice Sigler,
Chairman, United States Board of Parole); see Cook v. Willingham, 400
F.2d 885 (10th Cir. 1968).
104. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 486-89 (1971).
105. Id. at 489. The Court in Morrissey failed to specify the length
of the period, after disclosure and before the hearing, in which the paro-
lee may prepare his defense.
106. 418 U.S. at 563-64.
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pare his defense. 0 7 The Court was not asked to consider whether
disclosure of adverse evidence is required, however, and made no
mention of the issue in its opinion.
Because the need for preparation obviously is as strong in
parole release proceedings as in parole revocation or disciplinary
proceedings, Morrissey and Wolff support the notice requirement
included in the federal rules. They fall short, however, of requir-
ing that inmates be accorded an unrestricted right to examine
the evidence to be introduced in release proceedings. Although
Morrissey and Wolff might be read to require parole officials
to provide the prisoner a complete summary of the information
in his file, such an interpretation is unwarranted in light of the
Court's brief treatment of the issue in those cases.'0 8
That prisoners have considerable interest in disclosure is sug-
gested by their apprehension over the quality of information in
their files.10 9 This apprehension is justified insofar as most cor-
rections departments have failed to develop adequate data collec-
tion methods. 1 0 Because caseworkers who prepare reports for
the parole board record primarily subjective impressions"'
and have relatively little opportunity to observe inmates,"-
the documents that are filed are often misleading or inaccur-
ate.1 13  Examination of the contents of his file would enable
107. Id.
108. Even though Morrissey requires a specific and complete disclos-
ure before parole revocation, the Court did not emphasize the importance
of such a procedure. There was no discussion of the disclosure issue
in Wolff.
The one circuit court of appeals that has considered whether prison-
ers seeking parole should be guaranteed full access to information has
deferred its decision pending further exploration by the district court of
developments in constitutional law that had occurred since the district
court rendered its decision. Childs v. United States Bd. of Parole, 511
F.2d 1270 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
109. Hearings on H.R. 13118, supra note 9, at 812 (testimony of Dr.
Stephen Fox, Professor of Psychology, University of Iowa).
110. PARKER, supra note 98, at 8.
111. Interviews and experience with institutional caseworkers indi-
cate that "[d]iagnostic categories used in correctional agencies tend to
be arbitrary, ambiguous and ad hoc. Prevailing diagnostic programs in
these agencies are self-serving, concerned primarily with lubricating the
work flow and reducing to a minimum the upsets in established rou-
tines." Shover, "Experts" and Diagnosis in Correctional Agencies, 20
CRImE & DELnrr. 347 (1974).
112. O'Leary, Issues and Trends in Parole Administration in the
United States, 11 Am. Clum. L. REv. 97, 112 (1972).
113. See Hearings on H.R. 13118, supra note 9, at 452 (testimony of




a prisoner to locate and direct the attention of the parole board
to any errors it contains.
To assess the merits of particular disclosures, however, it is
necessary to balance the prisoner's need for that information
against the government's need for withholding it. If disclosure
of an item of information merely involved opening a file, fiscal
concerns would be of little importance.114 But the exemptions
incorporated in the rules recognize government interests other
than those in economic administration, any one of which-in a
specific instance-could be compelling. Nevertheless, the poten-
tial for abuse inheres in the broad language of these exemp-
tions'1 5 and that language must therefore not be permitted-
in a specific instance-to obscure the particularized balancing
process advanced here. For example, the parole board may
receive evidence from an informer that, if believed, would
make parole unlikely. The potential parolee has a substantial
interest in learning both the source and content of this informa-
tion so that he can impeach the credibility of the informer and
offer rebuttal evidence at the release hearing. On the other
hand, the government has interests in protecting the informer
and preserving the secrecy of its investigative processes.
Admittedly, resolution of this hypothetical situation is diffi-
cult. Indeed, it is not susceptible of resolution in the absence
of specific facts. Notwithstanding the difficulty of the problem,
however, the strength of the prisoner's interest in such informa-
tion is sufficient to justify requiring the parole board to evaluate
-as precisely as possible- the likelihood that government inter-
ests are genuinely threatened by its disclosure. The board must
be required to justify nondisclosure of either the source or con-
tent of adverse evidence on more than the general theory that
114. Additional information relevant to the release determination
could probably be included at a minimal cost with information presently
required to be divulged. Cf. Parole Release Decisionmaking, supra note
49, at 865.
115. For example, social and investigative agencies often demand
confidentiality before providing data to the parole board, see Hearings
on, H.R. 13118, supra note 9, at 382-83 (testimony of George Reed, Chair-
man, United States Board of Parole). It is the policy of the federal pa-
role board to restrict disclosure "in order to prevent clearly unwarranted
invasions of the personal privacy of prisoners, ex-convicts, and persons
communicating with the Board on the assumption of confidentiality." 40
Fed. Reg. 41,329 (1975) (discussion of rule changes by Maurice Sigler,
Chairman, United States Board of Parole). If the above-mentioned
agencies required confidentiality in all cases, this exemption could be
employed to circumvent the general requirement of disclosure.
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the work of informers necessitates confidentiality.(' And in
any event, a determination that the person who supplied the evi-
dence needs protection fails, without more, to justify nondis-
closure of its content. Indeed, it has been suggested that in all
cases the prisoner should receive a general summary of the
undisclosed adverse information."17
In cases in which an attorney represents the prisoner, the
latter's needs could be met and problems of security could prob-
ably be avoided if the attorney had full access to material with-
held from the prisoner."" Through his lawyer, then, the
prisoner could correct omissions and mistakes, seek clarification,
question credibility, and adequately rebut any derogatory in-
formation that the parole board might consider in making its
decision.
The federal rules fail to require the fact of nondisclosure
to be noted in the record of the parole release hearing. Because
knowledge of information on which the parole board relied is
necessary for adequate administrative or judicial review of its
decision," 9 this is a significant omission which ought to be reme-
died.
C. CONFRONTATION AN CRoss-ExAMINATIoN OF ADVERSE
WITNESSES
Although its rules were recently amended, the United States
Board of Parole did not change prior law to provide federal pris-
oners with the opportunity to confront and cross-examine ad-
verse witnesses at parole release hearings.1 20  The Supreme
116. Nondisclosure might be a relatively rare problem, for in a small
sampling of presentence reports, less than 10 percent contained confiden-
tial or other information that even arguably needed to be withheld from
the prisoner or his counsel. Hearings or the Parole Reorganization Act,
supra note 50, at 169 (testimony of Antonin Scalia, Chairman, Adminis-
trative Conference of the United States).
117. Administrative Conference of the United States, Recommenda-
tion 72-3: Procedures of the United States Board of Parole, June 9, 1972,
reprinted in Hearings on the Parole Reorganization Act, supra note 50,
at 200, 201.
118. This privilege of examination should not be accorded other pris-
oners who serve as representatives and who may interact with the pris-
oner socially and be tempted to use the information in an unprofessional
manner.
119. Working Papers of the National Conference on Criminal Justice
(quoted in Hearings on the Parole Reorganization Act, supra note 50,
at 250).
120. Confrontation and 'cross-examination are rarely permitted by
state parole boards. See PAnKER, supra note 98, at 57-188.
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Court has recognized, however, that "[i]n almost every setting
where important decisions turn on questions of fact, due process
requires an opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse
witnesses.' 21  The Court applied this precept in Goldberg v.
Kelly to proceedings for the termination of public assistance pay-
ments, where the denial of welfare benefits was based on a case-
worker's observation of a recipient's activities. It observed that
confrontation and cross-examination are particularly important
procedural safeguards in these circumstances, because "the evi-
dence consists of the testimony of individuals whose memory
might be faulty or who, in fact, might be perjurers or persons
motivated by malice, vindictiveness, intolerance, prejudice, or
jealousy.' 2 2  The caseworker's motives were not directly im-
pugned in Goldberg, but the Court recognized that human error
might occur and that the attitude of some witnesses toward those
receiving welfare might prejudice the recipient's case. 23
The parolee, like the welfare recipient, is in receipt of
benefits that may be terminated on the basis of factual deter-
minations. Thus, in Morrissey a limited form of cross-examina-
tion was permitted at the two hearings required prior to parole
revocation. 2 4  The Court refused to allow questioning of an
adverse witness only where the hearing officer had determined
that the witness would be subjected to possible harm were his
identity disclosed.' 25 In contrast, the majority in Wolff denied
prisoners the opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse
witnesses at prison disciplinary hearings on the grounds that if
these protections were granted, there would be "considerable
potential for havoc inside the prison walls," and "proceedings
121. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 269 (1971).
122. Id. at 270 (quoting Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496-97
(1959)). See also J. WIGMORE, EVINCE § 1367, at 32 (3d ed. 1940):
The belief that no safeguard for testing the value of human
statements is comparable to that furnished by cross-examina-
tion, and the conviction that no statement . . . should be used
as testimony until it has been probed and sublimated by that
test, has found increasing strength in lengthening experience.
123. In Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971), however, the
Court held that a claimant of disability insurance benefits who failed
to subpoena the written report of a physician who had examined him
could not use cross-examination to subsequently challenge the doctor's
findings. It assumed that the report was "routine, standard and unbi-
ased" because the physician had seen the patient only once and because
five specialists who independently had examined Perales reached con-
sistent conclusions. Id. at 402-04.
124. 408 U.S. at 487-89.
125. Id. at 487.
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would inevitably be longer and tend to unmanageability."'120
It reasoned that cross-examination of known inmate accusers or
guards may not present much danger,127 but that reprisal
might follow cross-examination of previously unknown infor-
mants.128 Moreover, the Court observed that persons otherwise
willing to comment on inmate behavior might refuse to do so
if compelled to testify publicly. 2 9 The chance to cross-
examine was denied even where the questioning of a particular
adverse witness would not prove sufficiently disruptive to out-
weigh the prisoner's interest in cross-examination, because the
Court felt that a constitutional guarantee, although limited,
would produce substantial litigation and provide little basis for
upsetting the assessments of prison officials as to the extent of
potential disorder. 30  In sum, the Court left the provision of
this procedure in disciplinary proceedings to the discretion of
prison officials. Thus, cross-examination was permitted in
Morrissey, where a parole officer testified about a parolee's
behavior during release, but denied in Wolff, where other
inmates and prison personnel testified about a prisoner's conduct.
Direct, in-prison contact between accuser and accused distin-
guished the potentially more explosive disciplinary proceeding
from the parole revocation proceeding.
If inmates and prison personnel testify or otherwise submit
evidence against a potential parolee at his release hearing,131
rigid adherence to precedent would preclude him from confront-
ing and cross-examining them. A blanket refusal to provide for
the availability of cross-examination, however, may not accur-
ately reflect the balance of prisoner and government interests
in this context.
The Court's rationale for denying this safeguard in all dis-
ciplinary proceedings-its desire to avoid extensive litigation of
126. 418 U.S. at 567.
127. Id. at 568-69.
128. Id. at 568.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 568-69. Wolff seems to depart from prior cases in which
cross-examination was permitted upon a showing of arguably greater
government interests and lesser private interests than those advanced
with respect to disciplinary proceedings. See, e.g., Greene v. McElroy,
360 U.S. 474 (1959) (national security versus right to employment).
131. The United States Board of Parole, for example, considera insti-
tutional experience (including interpersonal relationships with staff and
inmates), behavior (including misconduct), and reports of the officials
in each institution in which the parole applicant has been confined. 28
C.F.R. §§ 2.19(f) (2), 2.21 (1975).
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a constitutional standard that would be subsumed in any event
by the deference that must be given the judgment of prison offi-
cials-fails to fully acknowledge the strength of an inmate's need
to be able to conduct cross-examination where punishment is at
stake.1 32 Like the decision to terminate welfare benefits, a disci-
plinary determination involves important private interests1 33 and
turns on questions of fact.13 4  Not only might witnesses make
perceptual mistakes, but they might also be motivated by vindic-
tiveness. 13 5 And while the majority in Wolff offers no empirical
data in support of its claim that cross-examination would jeopar-
dize institutional order and safety, a majority of states permit
confrontation and some form of cross-examination in prison disci-
plinary proceedings without noticeable effect on security or
safety. 30  There is thus no cogent basis for a blanket refusal
of cross-examination of every adverse witness in each disci-
plinary proceeding; however, if prison officials establish that the
government's interest in institutional and personal safety is
genuinely endangered by the disclosure of the identity of a par-
ticular witness through questioning, then cross-examination of
that witness might be proscribed. 37  Since the government's
interest in prison security is rarely implicated in parole release
proceedings,138 there, too, cross-examination should be per-
mitted except in extraordinary circumstances. Nevertheless,
some courts have attempted to minimize the need for cross-
examination in parole release hearings by asserting that the
132. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 584-90 (1974) (Marshall
& Brennan, JJ., dissenting); id. at 595-97 (Douglas, 3., dissenting);
Clutchette v. Procunier, 497 F.2d 809, 819-20 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. granted
sub noam. Enomoto v. Clutchette, 420 U.S. 1010 (1975).
133. Justice Marshall, writing for himself and Justice Brennan, noted
that the right to cross-examination is available when the loss of a job
is at stake and reasoned that an additional prison sentence is a penalty
at least as serious as loss of employment. Id. at 585 (dissenting opinion).
See note 130 supra.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 586. See id. at 593 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 489 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Inmate frustration has,
in fact, been relieved by allowing cross-examination. Id. at 588-89 (cit-
ing ABA COMmISSION ON CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES AND SERVICES, SuRvEY
or PRisoN DisciPLINARY PRACTICES AND PRocEDuREs 20-22 (1974); TASK
FORCE REPORT, supra note 65, at 13, 82-83).
137. The Court adopted this approach in Morrissey with respect to
parole revocation proceedings, see text accompanying note 125 supra, and
Justice Marshall recommended it in his dissent in Wolff, 418 U.S. at 589.
See Clutchette v. Procunier, 497 F.2d 809, 819-20 (9th Cir. 1974), cert.
granted sub nom. Enomoto v. Clutchette, 420 U.S. 1010 (1975).
138. See note 72 supra and accompanying text.
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parole board is not the adversary of the potential parolee. 3 9
They fail to recognize, however, that if the parole determination
were truly nonadversarial, granting this due process protection
would create little potential for disruption. Moreover, the asser-
tion that parole release decisions are benign determinations is
open to question.140 Indeed, because hearing examiners may
be required to resolve factual disputes, the burden of establishing
that cross-examination would be superfluous is a heavy one.141
Cross-examination, restricted only if a bona fide threat of
disruption exists, presents no substantial danger to government
interests.1 42 Even where questioning would disclose the iden-
tity of an informant, in some circumstances the prisoner's need
for examining the credibility of that witness might be so great
that the balance of prisoner and government interests would
favor cross-examination. In such a situation, protecting a testi-
fying inmate through temporary segregation 143 or permitting
examination of the witness by the prisoner's attorney in a closed
hearing might accommodate the competing interests. Where
both the prisoner and his attorney are denied the opportunity
to question an adverse witness, the hearing panel should examine
the informant in camera, probe his credibility, and note the ab-
sence of cross-examination in its statement of decision. 44
D. WRITTEN STATEMENT OF THE EVIDENCE RELIED ON AND THE
REASONS FOR DENYING PAROLE
At the conclusion of a federal parole hearing, the hearing
examiners must inform the prisoner of their tentative decision
and, if parole is to be denied, the reasons therefor.1 4 5 In addi-
139. See, e.g., Menechino v. Oswald, 430 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 1023 (1971).
140. See notes 184-85 infra and accompanying text.
141. See text accompanying note 121 supra.
142. Permitting cross-examination may make parole release hearings
more time-consuming. Cf. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 589 (1974)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (prison disciplinary proceedings). But given
the strong need of the potential parolee to cross-examine adverse wit-
nesses, the government interest in brisk administration of parole deter-
minations seems diminutive. Cf. id.
143. Clutchette v. Procunier, 497 F.2d 809, 817 (9th Cir. 1974), cert.
granted sub noam. Enomoto v. Clutchette, 420 U.S. 1010 (1975).
144. Cf. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 590 (1974) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
145. 28 C.F.R. § 2.13(a) (1975). In 1972, reasons for denial of parole
were provided to applicants in 34 states. United States ex rel. Johnson
v. Chairman of N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 500 F.2d 925, 934 (2d Cir.), va-
cated as moot sub nom. Regan v. Johnson, 419 U.S. 1015 (1974).
[Vol. 60:341
PAROLE RELEASE PROCEEDINGS
tion, within 15 working days of the hearing, the prisoner must
receive written notification of the final decision, including rea-
sons for the determination if parole is denied.146  The reasons
that are furnished in either instance might be sweeping; however,
the federal parole rules also provide for further specificity in
certain circumstances.
1 47
The general procedure embodied in the federal rules requir-
ing a statement of reasons for parole denial resembles the com-
munication of reasons for agency action that has been consti-
tutionally mandated in other contexts. In Goldberg v. Kelly the
146. 28 C.F.R. § 2.13(d) (1975). Written records of the reasons for
parole denial were kept by only 11 parole boards in 1972. O'Leary &
Nuffield, A National Survey of Parole Decision-making, 19 CanIM & DE-
LIN. 378, 387 (1973).
147. The parole board rules now provide:
(b) ... [T]he reasons for parole denial may include, but are
not limited to, the following reasons, with further specif-
ication where appropriate:
(1) Release at this time would depreciate the seriousness
of the offense committed and would thus be incompatible
with the welfare of society.(2) There does not appear to be a reasonable probability
at this time that the prisoner would live and remain at
liberty without violating the law.
(3) The prisoner has (a serious) (repeated) disciplinary
infraction(s) in the institution.
(4) Additional institutional treatment is required to en-
hance the prisoner's capacity to lead a law-abiding life.
(c) In lieu of or in combination with the reasons in paragraph(b) (1) and (2) of this section the prisoner after initial
hearings shall be furnished a guideline evaluation state-
ment which includes the prisoner's salient factor score and
offense severity rating .... , as well as the reasons for a
decision to continue the prisoner for a period outside the
range indicated by the guidelines.
28 C.F.R. §§ 2.13(b), (c) (1975). Two of the acceptable reasons for pa-
role denial contained in subsection (b) are made more specific by sub-
section (c). The guideline evaluation statement furnished the prisoner
under subsection (c) permits him to discover the evidence on which the
Board relied in reaching its decision. In addition, the Board must justify
its decision that the prisoner remain incarcerated beyond the term set
for his release, as determined by application of the statistical guidelines
to the numerical factors of the guideline evaluation statement. Where
the Board's decision conforms to the guidelines, the policies underlying
the guidelines implicitly provide this further justification. Thus, a pris-
oner denied parole on the basis of paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection
(b) has an opportunity to learn of the evidence said to support the deci-
sion and to receive a further explanation as to the reasons these facts
should preclude his release.
In contrast, the other enumerated acceptable reasons for denying pa-
role, paragraphs (3) and (4) of subsection (b), are not specifically ex-
planative, do not reveal the evidence underlying the decision, and are
not subject to refinement by the operation of subsection (c). Subsection
(b), however, does provide for "further specification where appropriate."
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decisionmaker was required to disclose his rationale for denying
welfare eligibility and to indicate the evidence on which he relied
in making that determination. 148 Although the Court required
a statement of reasons sufficient to verify that the decisionmaker
reached his conclusion in accordance with the rules of evidence
under which the hearing had been conducted, it did not demand
a full opinion or formal findings of fact and conclusions of law. 149
The Supreme Court applied the Goldberg approach in
Morrissey v. Brewer in requiring a statement of reasons after
both the preliminary probable cause hearing and subsequent
parole revocation hearing.150 Similarly, the Court in Wolff v.
McDonnell required a written decision and statement of reasons
following prison disciplinary proceedings; however, hearing offi-
cers were allowed to omit certain evidentiary items if personal or
institutional safety is implicated, although the prisoner must be
informed of the omission.15' A statement of reasons was
required because disciplinary actions may be reviewed by other
bodies; 152 moreover, prisoners need protection against collat-
eral consequences that might arise if the basis for the original
disciplinary decision were misunderstood.'53
Several circuit courts of appeals have concluded that individ-
ual and government interests are enhanced if parole boards are
required to provide written reasons for denial of parole. 5 4
'These courts are convinced that a written rationale will facilitate
judicial review,' 55 provide a more effective check on arbitrari-
ness, 56 promote thoughtful decisionmaking by the parole
148. 397 U.S. at 271.
149. Id.
150. 408 U.S. at 487, 489. The procedure was intended to "reduc[e]
the risk of error." Id. at 487.
151. 418 U.S. at 565.
152. Disciplinary matters may be considered in deciding whether to
transfer a prisoner from one institution to another; in addition, prisoner
conduct is often considered at parole release hearings. Disciplinary deci-
sions also may be subjected to public and judicial scrutiny. If the rea-
sons for punishment were divulged in all cases, administrators subject
to review would have an additional incentive to act fairly in their deal-
ings with inmates. Id.
153. Id.
154. E.g., Childs v. United States Bd. of Parole, 511 F.2d 1270 (D.C.
Cir. 1974); United States ex rel. Johnson v. Chairman of N.Y. State Bd. of
Parole, 500 F.2d 925 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot sub noma. Regan v. John-
son, 419 U.S. 1015 (1974).
155. United States ex rel. Johnson v. Chairman of N.Y. State Bd. of
Parole, 500 F.2d 925, 929 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot sub nom. Regan v.
Johnson, 419 U.S. 1015 (1974).
156. Id. at 929-31 (concern expressed over the enormous discretion
exercised by boards of parole).
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board, 5 7 enhance consistency of decisions by establishing a
body of precedent,5 8 and relieve the frustration of prisoners
by apprising them of ways to improve their conduct and thereby
qualify for parole.5 9
A right to know the reasons for parole denial might be
qualified in deference to government interests in efficient and
economical parole administration and preservation of personal
or institutional safety. The evidence gleaned from a pilot
project recently conducted by the United States Board of Parole
indicates, however, that the provision of reasons for parole denial
need not impair the conservation of financial resources and the
maintenance of order in the prison.160 In that project, the
Board communicated its parole decision and reasons therefor to
the applicant within five days of the release hearing,' 6' thus
minimizing the anxiety that prisoners normally experience dur-
ing the waiting period. Not only were the informed inmates
157. Parole decisions are made in a matter of a few minutes, and
time constraints often cause much important information to be over-
looked. Id. at 933. Accord, King v. United States, 492 F.2d 1337, 1340-
41 n.11 (7th Cir. 1974) (quoting Johnson, Federal Parole Procedures,
25 AD. L. REV. 459, 484-85 (1973) ):
It is not to impugn the good faith or competence of the Board
to suggest the possibility that in some cases it might rely on
reasons for denying parole that the courts would feel were
improper or unconstitutional if they knew of them.
158. Establishment of precedent would also educate judges who set
minimum sentences and are expected to "play an important part in the
parole process." United States ex rel. Johnson v. Chairman of N.Y. State
Bd. of Parole, 500 F.2d 925, 933 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot sub nom. Re-
gan v. Johnson, 419 U.S. 1015 (1974).
159. 500 F.2d at 932-33; see Kastenmeier & Eglit Parole Release De-
cision-Making: Rehabilitation, Expertise and the Demise of Mythology, 22
Am. U.L. REv. 477, 503-10 (1973) (reporting that prison disturbances have
been attributed to unexpected denials of parole); Hearings on H.R. 13118,
supra note 9, at 270-71 (testimony of former prisoner Raymond Harlan)
(prisoners perceive no discernible pattern in parole decisionmaking, a
problem that could be alleviated by providing reasons for denial of pa-
role).
160. The National Conference on Criminal Justice has recommended
that parole examiners specify in detail and in writing the reasons for
their decisions. Hearings on the Parole Reorganization Act, supra note
50, at 250. The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the
Administration of Justice similarly concluded that "Board members can
also influence the behavior of inmates by .. . frankly discussing with
them, at appropriate times, the probable consequences of failure to par-
ticipate in proceedings or of misconduct." TAsK Fo Rc REPoRT, supra
note 65, at 64.
161. Hearings on the Parole Reorganization Act, supra note 50, at




better able to understand how to improve their behavior, but
the procedure enhanced their attitude about the parole process
as well.162 This experiment supports the finding of a number
of state corrections authorities that disclosure of reasons follow-
ing denial of parole is an improvement over their earlier
practices. 163
Thus, both case law and experience in the prison suggest that
the balance of prisoner and government interests in the parole
release context requires that a statement of the reasons and evi-
dence relied on for parole denial be given to the prisoner.0 4
Moreover, the prisoner and government interests in a statement
of reasons for parole denial would be fully served only if the
reasons were in writing and stated with specificity. The courts
have shown a particular and appropriate awareness of the neces-
sity for written feedback. 165 And while either a written or an
oral statement of reasons may facilitate prisoner rehabilitation,
an oral communication cannot aid a reviewing court that must
decide whether a parole board has abused its discretion. Fur-
thermore, reasons for parole denial become meaningful to pris-
oners only when they are stated in detail. 60 It would be unrea.
sonable to demand that a parole board issue a full opinion after
each hearing; however, courts should require that a statement
be written with significant elaboration.0 7  The most stringent
162. Id. at 128-29. The results of the pilot study were so encouraging
that the Board made definite plans to implement many features of the
project on a more extensive basis. Id. at 127.
163. TAsK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6 5, at 65.
164. Institutional or personal safety, the government interest found
sufficient in Wolff to qualify the right to know certain evidence on which
officials relied in a particular disciplinary determination, might be ac-
commodated through one of the exemptions for disclosure requirements:
the source and specific content of the evidence relied on to deny parole
should be withheld only insofar as necessary to guard against a genuine
threat to personal safety. See text accompanying notes 114-16 supra. If
certain evidentiary items are not disclosed to the prisoner, the statement
should indicate the fact of the omission. Cf. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418
U.S. 539, 565 (1974).
165. See notes 154-59 supra and accompanying text.
166. "It does no good to tell a prisoner he is being denied parole
because he is a danger to society unless he i told why he is so regarded,
and whether there is anything he can do to convince the Board other-
wise." Johnson, supra note 157, at 485.
The United States Board of Parole experimented with a checklist
form in communicating to prisoners the reasons for denial of parole.
This checklist was supplemented by a sentence or two of individualized
explanation, but the brief communication proved to be unsatisfactory.
Hearings on the Parole Reorganization Act, supra note 50, at 203.
167. A "brief" statement of reasons indicating that early parole
[Vol. 60:341
PAROLE RELEASE PROCEEDINGS
elaboration mandated by the federal parole board rules 68 is illus-
trative of the particularity with which reasons must be stated
to meet the standards of due process.
E. RIGHT TO COUNSEL
A federal prisoner may choose a person to represent him at
parole release proceedings. 16 9 The role of such a representative
is limited, however, to providing information requested by the
examining panel and presenting a concluding statement. 70 Pres-
ent federal law fails to guarantee representation to indigent pris-
oners.171
By contrast, the Supreme Court has enabled retained coun-
sel to take a more active role in public assistance eligibility
hearings because an attorney can help "delineate the issues,
present the factual contentions in an orderly manner, conduct
cross-examination, and generally safeguard the interests of the
recipient."'172 The Court in Goldberg v. Kelly rejected the
argument that legal assistance would unduly prolong or encum-
ber a welfare eligibility hearing.17 3 In embraced a similar
argument in Gagnon v. Scarpelli,1 7 4 however, in holding that
would deprecate the seriousness of the petitioner's particular offense and
encouraging him to continue his "excellent institutional adjustment and
well conceived parole plans" satisfied minimum due process require-
ments, according to the court in United States ex rel. Richerson v. Wolff,
525 F.2d 797 (7th Cir. 1975). The generality of this brief statement, how-
ever, is an insufficient basis on which a reviewing court might scrutinize
the parole board's decision; moreover, it fails to apprise the prisoner of
what he must do in order to obtain parole release.
168. See note 147 supra.
169. 28 C.F.R. § 2.12(a) (1975).
170. Id. The Board recently reaffirmed its policy limiting the par-
ticipation of representatives throughout the release hearing. 40 Fed.
Reg. 41,330 (1975). This limitation reduces the utility of representation
on the federal level because prisoner representatives are urged to com-
ment on factors that rarely determine the outcome of the hearing. Pa-
role Release Decisionmaking, supra note 49, at 839.
171. While indigents are rarely guaranteed representation at state
parole hearings, the presence of counsel during such hearings is per-
mitted in 21 states. O'Leary, Issues and Trends in Parole Administration
in the United States, 11 Am. Cnm .L. REv. 97, 113 (1972). In most of
these states, counsel may only offer statements or petitions in writing
that are incorporated with other information considered by the parole
board. Rarely may counsel engage in oral argument at the hearing.
Newman, Intervention in the Parole Process, 36 ALBANY L. REv. 257, 265
(1972).
172. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 270-71 (1970).
173. Id. at 271.
174. 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
1976]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:341
the right to appointed counsel at a parole or probation revocation
hearing must be determined on a case-by-case basis., 75  The
Court acknowledged that the effectiveness of due process rights
generally depends on a parolee's education and skill,17 6 but
asserted that since there usually is no doubt about the guilt of
a probationer or parolee, the simplicity of the issues refutes any
requirement of representation by counsel. 77  The Court also
maintained that the introduction of counsel injects an adversary
element into revocation proceedings, thereby retarding rehabili-
tation.' 78 In Wolff v. McDonnell the Court refused to recognize
a right to legal representation at disciplinary hearings unless the
particular prisoner is illiterate or otherwise unable to cope with
the complexity of the issues. In such circumstances, he may re-
quest aid from a fellow inmate or one of the prison staff.'79 The
Wolff Court emphasized the adversarial tendencies of counsel, as
well as the delay and cost that would result if needy prisoners
were provided attorneys. 80
The focus of the majority of the Court on adversariness,
delay, and cost provides little support for the unconditional right
of a potential parolee to appointed counsel.' 8 ' The Court has not
175. Although the Court clearly wished to discourage the presence
of counsel at revocation hearings, it identified two situations in which
counsel would be presumptively required: (1) when the probationer or
parolee makes a timely and colorable claim that he has committed no
violation, or (2) when there are substantial factors mitigating the viola-
tion. Id. at 790. This presumption could arise in almost every hearing,
since a hearing generally presupposes a legitimate factual dispute over
a colorable claim on the part of the prisoner.
The Court has, in fact, required the assistance of counsel in a com-
bined probation revocation-deferred sentencing hearing. Mempa v.
Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967). If due process is mandated in parole release
proceedings because of the similarity of parole release and deferred sen-
tencing, see note 10 supra, Mempa is persuasive support for a right to
counsel during the release proceedings.
176. "[T]he unskilled or uneducated probationer or parolee may
well have difficulty in presenting his version of a disputed set of facts
where the presentation requires the examining or cross-examining of wit-
nesses or the offering or dissecting of complex documentary evidence."
411 U.S. at 787.
177. Id. Typically, the probationer or parolee has been convicted of
committing another crime or has admitted the charges against him. The
Court reasoned that mitigating evidence does not require complex pre-
sentation or evaluation. Id.
178. Id.
179. 418 U.S. at 570.
180. Id.
181. If a prisoner is peculiarly unable to deal with the issues to be
raised at a parole hearing, he might have a right to appointed counsel.
Cf. note 175 supra and accompanying text.
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completely rejected the role of the attorney in parole release pro-
ceedings, however. It should be noted that government interests
in efficiency and economy have not been heavily weighted by the
courts in other contexts;1 8 2 conversely, the importance of an at-
torney to a potential parolee should not be minimized. While
parole hearings have been characterized as benign determinations
of readiness to reenter society, 8 3 there are indications that parole
release is indeed an adversarial determination18 4 and that reha-
bilitation is not necessarily a predominant concern of parole
board membersls 5 If the setting were truly adversarial and the
motives of parole board members were not always benign, ele-
mentary notions of due process would require that the prisoner
have the benefit of a forceful advocate. But even if release hear-
ings were entirely nonadversarial, the courts could reconcile indi-
vidual and government interests by tailoring the role of the at-
torney to the character and precise requirements of the proceed-
ings.1816 For example, a lawyer might be allowed to examine his
client's file and advise him before, during, and after the hearing.
During the hearing counsel might be permitted to comment on
the facts, cross-examine adverse witnesses,' 8 7 and offer closing
remarks, yet be prohibited from making formal objections. In
sum, an attorney could advance significant prisoner interests
without disrupting the parole process.
182. See note 74 supra and accompanying text.
183. See note 139 supra and accompanying text.
184. See Hearings on H.R. 13118, supra note 9, at 500 (testimony of
William Parker, Senior Research Associate, Parole Corrections Project,
American Correctional Institution); cf. Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225, 253(D.C. Cir.) (Bazelon, C.J., & Edgerton, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 957 (1963); Recent Decision, Consti-
tutional Law-Parole Release Hearings Not Subject to Judicial Review
Nor Do Procedural Due Process Rights Adhere, 23 EMoRY L.J. 597, 612-
13 (1974).
185. Parole has been denied to facilitate the management of inmates
and to avoid the risk of public criticism. On the other hand, it has been
granted to reward informants, to relieve overcrowding in the prison, and
to maintain a given population level in order to sustain prison industry
or justify the budget. Hearings on H.R. 13118, supra note 9, at 237 (testi-
mony of Professor Fred Cohen, State University of New York).
186. The Supreme Court has recognized a "nonadversarial" role for
counsel in noncriminal juvenile proceedings, In re Gault, 387 U.. 1, 36(1961), and in welfare investigations. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,
270-71 (1970).
187. Permitting counsel to exercise the right of cross-examination for
his client probably would inject a further element of adversariness into
the proceeding, but it would also make the right more effective. Pre-
sumably, counsel would recognize that unnecessary or abusive question-
ing would not further his client's application for parole. See text accom-
panying note 190 infra.
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Prisoners often request lay assistance at parole release
hearings. 188 In this connection, attorney substitutes may be
capable of providing effective representation for inmates since
the questions involved in parole release are not distinctly
legal. 8 9 Indeed, nonlegal representatives have received more
positive treatment from federal hearing examiners than have
lawyers and law students; 90 examiners have reacted most fav-
orably to the representation provided by institutional em-
ployees.' 9 ' And while the overall impact of argument by attor-
neys or attorney substitutes is disputed, 92 such representatives
are at least considered. to be more objective than the inmate him-
self;193 in fact, they have demonstrably influenced some parole
board decisions. 94 Since the queslions considered by a parole
board are often complex' 95 and since many inmates are mini-
mally educated, 96 the right to such representation seems con-
sistent with the interests of both the prisoner and the parole
board.
In a pilot project undertaken by the United States Board
of Parole, each inmate was permitted to have a representative
present at his parole interview. Representation served the inter-
ests of the prisoners, in that they previously had expressed
considerable frustration at the fact that they were given no coun-
seling before their parole release hearings. 97 Representation es-
188. Parole Release Decisionmaking, supra note 49, at 840.
189. Hearings on H.R. 13118, supra, note 9, at 535 (testimony of
Llewellyn Linde, Chairman, Minnesota Adult Corrections Commission).
190. Parole Release Decisionmaking, supra note 49, at 839-40.
191. Id. at 841.
192. On the federal level, presence of a representative correlates with
a small reduction in the time served before release within the discretion-
ary range permitted under the statistical guidelines. Id.
193. Hearings on H.R. 13118, supra note 9, at 344 (testimony of San-
ford Rosen, Assistant Legal Director, American Civil Liberties Union).
194. "I have absolutely no doubt that . . . the ability of well-edu-
cated, relatively objective counsel to marshall facts and to explain cir-
cumstances was the difference between freedom and continued or re-
newed incarceration in a number of cases." Id. at 342. See also Parole
Release Decisionmaking, supra note 49, at 840 n.138 (advocacy of institu-
tional caseworkers influenced federal hearing examiners in two release
proceedings).
195. It would be logically inconsistent to emphasize the administra-
tive burden of permitting the assistance of counsel and at the same time
deny the need for the active participation of counsel in resolving a num-
ber of complicated questions.
196. Hearings on H.R. 13118, supra note 9, at 344 (testimony of San-
ford Rosen, Assistant Legal Director, American Civil Liberties Union).
197. Hearings on the Parole Reorganization Act, supra note 50, at
151 (comments of Representative Tom Rallsback).
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pecially benefited inmates who had difficulty expressing them-
selves.1 8 Government interests in rehabilitation and mainte-
nance of prison order were served as well, because one source of
prison disruption had been eliminated.199 Although attorneys
were initially barred from participating in the experiment,
[t]he Board [subsequently concluded] that there is no need
to preclude an attorney from appearing as an inmate's repre-
sentative . . . simply because he is an attorney, as long as he
realizes that parole release determinations do not, and should
not, involve an adversary presentation of issues of law or fact.200
Moreover, the Board found that the presence of an advocate was
neither unduly expensive nor time-consuming.201
III. CONCLUSION
Five circuit courts of appeals have interpreted recent
Supreme Court decisions as requiring procedural due process at
parole release hearings. This interpretation vindicates the rights
of prisoners, for denial of parole deprives them of both liberty
and property interests. On the basis of case law and experience
in the prison, rights to notice, a hearing, and a statement of the
reasons and evidence on which the deciding authority relied
should be unqualifiedly extended to prisoners seeking parole.
Although precedent points to qualified prehearing disclosure of
adverse evidence, a qualified right to call witnesses, denial of
confrontation and cross-examination, and the exclusion of coun-
sel from release proceedings, experience in the prison fails to
support the government's claim that such limitations are neces-
sary. Indeed, the prisoner's interest in each of these procedures
often appears to outweigh the government's generalized interests
in prison security and manageability. Consequently, although
the new federal rules take a desirable first step toward securing
the rights of prisoners, their provisions with respect to the calling
198. Hearings on the Parole Reorganization Act, supra note 50, at
128 (testimony of Maurice Sigler, Chairman, United States Board of Pa-
role).
199. One of the major causes of prison disturbances appears to be
the arbitrary manner in which parole is denied. Hearings on H.R. 13118,
supra note 9, at 644 (comments of Representative Stewart McKinney).
200. Hearings on the Parole Reorganization Act, supra note 50, at 128(testimony of Maurice Sigler, Chairman, United States Board of Parole).
201. Representatives were not requested in 60 percent of the inter-
views. Id. at 135. If appeal of the Board's decision is contemplated,
counsel could reduce judicial workload by sorting out frivolous claims
and petitions. Recent Decision, supra note 184, at 613.
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of witnesses, confrontation, and cross-examination may be uncon-
stitutional, and their nondisclosure provisions may be unconstitu-
tionally applied.
But even apart from issues of constitutionality, an erroneous
parole release determination is obviously an undesirable event
that should be avoided. Thus, it is perfectly clear that neglect
of appropriate procedural safeguards in parole release proceed-
ings will benefit neither the individual nor society.
